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Abstract. A ðt ; nÞ secret image-sharing scheme shares a secret
image to n participants, and the t users recover the image. During
the recovery procedure of a conventional secret image-sharing
scheme, cheaters may use counterfeit secret keys or modified shared
images to cheat other users’ secret keys and shared images. A
cheated secret key or shared image leads to an incorrect secret
image. Unfortunately, the cheater cannot be identified. We present
an exponent and modulus-based scheme to provide a tamper-
proof secret image-sharing scheme for identifying cheaters on secret
keys or shared images. The proposed scheme allows users to
securely select their secret key. This assignment can be performed
over networks. Modulus results of each shared image is calculated
to recognize cheaters of a shared image. Experimental results indi-
cate that the proposed scheme is excellent at identifying cheated
secret keys and shared images. © 2013 SPIE and IS&T. [DOI: 10
.1117/1.JEI.22.1.013008]
1 Introduction
Sharing images secretly is essential to protect important
images. Conventional (t, n) secret image-sharing methods
share one secret image to n shared images, and gathering
t shared images recovers the secret image. Thien and Lin1
presented an efficient secret image-sharing scheme by
using Shamir method for image sharing and using the
Lagrange interpolation method for reconstruction. Many
researchers further present functional image-sharing ideas
(e.g., reducing load in sharing multiple images,2
progressive,3–6 weighted,7 visual cryptography and secret
image sharing,8,9 scalable,10 and sharing with hiding).11
In addition to the Shamir-Lagrange method, many other
methods such as Blakley,12 Boolean,13 and Chinese
Remainder Theorem14 are also adopted to share important
images secretly.
Although numerous secret image-sharing methods have
been proposed, an efficient method of detecting cheaters
both in secret key and shared image has not been presented.
Currently, the convenience of computer networks allows
users to share and recover a secret image over networks
easily. However, hackers may use counterfeit secret keys
or modified shared image to misappropriate other partici-
pants’ authorized secret keys and shared images.
Therefore a structure of applying tamper-proof secret
image-sharing techniques over computer networks merits
the current study. Research has been presented to introduce
a method for identifying cheaters. Wu and Wu15 used hash
functions to collect shared messages and then generated a
large number for verification. Chang and Hwang16 improved
the Wu and Wu scheme to increase security by factoring
the product of two large prime numbers. Tan et al.17 pre-
sented a quadratic residue-based secret sharing scheme.
Other researchers further discussed cheaters’ identification
approaches to secret image-sharing problems. Chen and
Suen18 adopted the Wu and Wu scheme to verify the authen-
ticity of shared images. Zhao et al.19 presented an exponent
computation-based secret key verification scheme. Although
some works on detecting cheaters in secret image-sharing
problems are present, a complete solution for detecting
cheaters both in secret keys and shared images is unavailable.
Therefore the current study presents a secret image-sharing
scheme to efficiently detect cheaters in secret keys and
shared images. A significant aspect of the proposed scheme
relies on not needing a one-way hash function because a
security issues existed in hash functions.17
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews important secret image-sharing schemes on
detecting cheaters. Section 3 introduces the proposed
tamper-proof secret image-sharing scheme. Algorithms of
initial procedure, sharing a secret image to shared images,
recovering with verification from secret keys and shared
images, and security analysis are presented in Secs. 3.1–3.4,
respectively. Section 4 provides experimental results and
comparisons between the proposed scheme and other meth-
ods. Section 5 offers a conclusion with suggestions for future
research.
2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literatures on cheater detection of
secret image-sharing problems. We review the publications
of Chen and Suen18 and Zhao et al.19 in Secs. 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively.
2.1 Review of the Chen and Suen’s Secret
Image-Sharing Scheme
Chen and Suen18 adopted the Wu and Wu15 plan—which is
based on a one-way hash function h, a selected prime number
P, and a calculated large number T—to identify cheaters in a
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secret sharing scheme. Both sharing and recovering strate-
gies are examined in the study of Chen and Suen (t, n)
scheme.
In the sharing procedure, the secret image is shared with n
shared images y1, y2; : : : ; yn using the Shamir secret sharing
method. Then a large number T is calculated and publicly
accessed, where T ¼Pni¼1 hðyiÞp2ði−1Þ þ
P
n−1
i¼1 cp
2i−1, 1 ≤
c < p and hðÞ is a hash function.
During recovering procedure, all collected shared images
yj are checked by functions T

j ¼
P
hðyjÞp2ðj−1Þ andj
T − Tj∕p2ðj−1Þ
k
ðmodpÞ ¼ 0 to determine whether yj is
a cheating shared image. Then the Lagrange interpolation
method is applied to recover the secret image s, when the
number of correct yj is t.
2.2 Review of the Zhao et al.’s Secret
Image-Sharing Scheme
Zhao et al.19 applied Thien and Lin’s1 secret image-sharing
scheme for sharing a secret image and verified it by modulus
calculation. Assume that H is the secret image keeper and Pi
(i ¼ 1; : : : ; n) denotes each participant. Three procedures—
initial, sharing, and recovering—are needed in their
approach.
During the initial process, the keeper H publishes two
parameters fg; n0g. Then each participant Pi selects his or
her secret key si and calculates his or her public parameter ri.
When sharing the secret image, the keeper H calculates
two parameters r0 and wi, and then chooses two other
parameters, fr0; fg, for sharing the image. H then calculates
the shared message by hjðwiÞ ¼ ðb0 þ b1wi þ : : :þ
bt−1wt−1i Þ mod 251, where b0, b1; : : : ; bt−1 are pixel values.
Then H publishes fhjðwtÞg.
During the recovering with verification procedure, each
participant Pi calculates the checked message w 0i . If
wi ¼ w 0i , H confirms participant Pi by providing a verified
secret key, and the secret image can be reconstructed.
Without verification, Pi is a confirmed cheater. The correct
reconstructed image is then calculated using the Lagrange
interpolation method.
In Zhao et al.’s scheme, the accuracy of a shared image
relies on its corresponding secret key, rather than checking
content of the shared image itself. This creates a gap in the
security. Therefore we present a secure secret image-sharing
scheme that checks the validity of secret key and the
shared image.
3 Proposed Scheme
This section introduces the proposed (t, n) tamper-proof
secret image-sharing scheme. Assume that Pi i ¼
1; 2; : : : ; n, denotes each participant. In Sec. 3.1, the pro-
posed scheme first allows each participant to configure his
secret key. Section 3.2 presents a description of the image
sharing process. Section 3.3 shows the verification and
reconstruction processes for keys and shared images.
Section 3.4 analyzes the security of the proposed scheme.
3.1 Initial Algorithm
This section uses exponent and modulus computation to
determine each participant’s secret key. Steps of initial algo-
rithm are illustrated as follows.
1. The dealer selects two prime numbers, p0 and q0, and
calculates n0 ¼ p0 × q0.
2. The dealer selects an integer g0, satisfying gcd
ðg0; n0Þ ¼ 1 and then publishes fn0; g0g.
3. Each participant Pi chooses two prime numbers pi and
qi, and then calculates their product ni, denoted by
ni ¼ pi × qi. Pi chooses another integer gi, satisfying
gcd ðgi; niÞ ¼ 1, and then calculates its multiplicative
inverse fi, satisfying gi × fi ¼ 1 mod ðpi − 1Þ×
ðqi − 1Þ.
4. Pi publishes fgi; nig.
5. Participant Pi takes pi as his or her secret key and
sends fi and ri to the dealer, where ri ¼ gpt0 mod n0.
The dealer should preserve each received ri differently,
which means that each Pi possesses different secret key
pi, to distinguish participant’s role. This extra step requires
participants possessing identical ri, to repeat steps 3 to 5 to
obtain new secret key. Furthermore, the prime number pi is
the secret key that Pi possesses, whereas the dealer retains ri
instead of pi.
3.2 Sharing Algorithm
When sharing the image, the dealer should first calculate
new key wi for each participant. The following algorithm
illustrates the steps taken during the sharing process.
1. The dealer randomly selects an integer s0 ∈ ½2; n0,
satisfying gcd ½s0; ðp0 − 1Þ ¼ 1 and gcd ½s0;
ðp0 − 1Þ ¼ 1.
2. The dealer computes r0 and wi, where r0 ¼ g0s0 mod
n0, wi ¼ ris0 mod n0.
3. The dealer sends r0 to each participant Pi.
4. The dealer partitions the secret image to blocks of t
pixels, where Bk k ¼ 1; : : : ; r denotes each partitioned
block and r is the block number. The dealer then
applies to each block Bk the following steps.
4.1.Replace Bk by Bk
L
Rk, where Rk is a random block
and
L
denotes Exclusive-OR operation.
4.2. It constructs a polynomial function fkðxÞ ¼
ðb0 þ b1xþ : : : þ bt−1xt−1Þ mod 251, where b0,
b1; : : : ; bt−1 represent t pixels in one Bk block.
4.3.The dealer calculates yi;k ¼ fkðwiÞ, where wi
(i ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; n) is obtained from step 2.
4.4.The dealer calculates xi;k ¼ ygii;k mod ni for the
shared image belonging to participant Pi.
4.5 The dealer randomly selects a prime number c and
computes hi;k ¼ cyi;k mod n, where n is a number
defined by larger than number of participants and
mod ðc; nÞ ¼ 1.
4.6.The dealer randomly selects a prime number a and
computes Tk ¼
Pn
i¼1
hi;kai, with a > n.
5. The dealer sends shared image Xi, which is formed
from xi;k (k ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; r), to participants Pi and pub-
lishes fTkg.
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Since in conventional Shamir-Lagrange method, a prime
number is needed and the number is determined by 251 in
the proposed scheme. Therefore all parameters bi in step 4.2
must be restricted between 0 and 250. However, largest pixel
value is 255. Consequently, this gap can be solved by Thien
and Lin’s method.1 For an image pixel g, gwill be partitioned
to two numbers 250 and g-250 if 250 ≤ g ≤ 255. Two num-
bers 250 and g-250 represent two parameters bi in step 4.2.
3.3 Recovering with Verification Algorithm
This section presents the verification algorithm that accom-
panies the image recovery process. First the dealer verifies
the authenticity of each participant’s possessing key pi
and shared image Xi. Then the dealer uses these secret
keys and shared images to reconstruct the secret image.
The following is an algorithm for recovering with
verification.
1. The dealer acquires the participant’s shared image
Xi to calculate the original shared message yi;j by
yi;j ¼ xfii;j mod ni, where xi;j is the j’th number in Xi.
2. The dealer employs the participant Pi’s secret key
pi and yi;j to verify Pi’s authenticity by checking
whether wi is equal to w 0i (w 0i ¼ rpi0 mod n0) and
whether hi;j (hi;j ¼ cyi;j mod n) is equal to
h 0i;k (h 0i;k ¼ bTk∕aic mod a).
3. When all participants are authenticated, the following
Lagrange interpolation method on each set of secret
keys and shared messages (wi; yi;j) is calculated by
fkðxÞ ¼
Xt
i¼1
yi;j
Yt
j¼1
x − wj
wi − wj
mod 251
¼ ðb0 þ b1xþ · · · þbt−1xt−1Þ mod 251;
where coefficients b0, b1; : : : ; bt−1 represent pixels of
one secret image block Bk.
4. Replace Bk by Bk
L
Rk, where Rk is the random block
used in sharing algorithm.
5. Combine all Bk blocks to acquire the reconstructed
secret image.
Note that step 3 is performed when all keys pi and shared
images Xi are verified.
3.4 Security Analysis
This section analyzes the security of the proposed tamper-
proof secret image-sharing scheme. First we will check
whether any cheated modification on secret key or shared
image can be well detected. Then, since the proposed scheme
adopts exponent and modulus computation, we also analyze
the common modulus attack in this section.
Fig. 1 (a) secret image; (b) to (f) five shared images; (g) reconstructed image from (b) and (c).
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The secret key is verified by exponential computation.
In step 2 of the recovering with verification algorithm,
w 0i ¼ rpi0 , where r0 ¼ gs00 is defined in step 2 of the sharing
algorithm. Therefore w 0i ¼ rpi0 ¼ ðgs00 Þpi ¼ ðgpi0 Þs0 ¼ rs0i ¼
wi, since ri ¼ gpi0 , as defined in step 5 of the initial algorithm.
Consequently, the accuracy of the proposed verification
procedure is proved. For any cheated secret key as defined
by replacing pi by p 0i satisfying p
0
i ≠ pi, the verification
becomes checking whether cheated w 0i ¼ rp
0
i
0 ¼ ðgs00 Þp
0
i ¼
ðgp 0i0 Þ
s0 and wi ¼ rs0i ¼ ðgpi0 Þs0 are the same. Note that all
these computations are calculated under mod n0. This equiv-
alence verification can be described as checking whether
(g
p 0i
0 mod n0) is equivalent to (g
pi
0 mod n0). Thus a participant
Pi can choose another secret key p 0i satisfying g
p 0i
0 ¼
gpi0 mod n0. However, when n0 is a very large number, p
0
i is
Table 1 The parameters used in the experiments.
Procedure Parameters Values Public parameters Values
Initial algorithm (p0, q0) (5,7) n0 35
g0 17 g0 17
(p1, q1, r 1) (11, 43, 33) (g1, n1) (7, 473)
(p2, q2, r 2) (17, 19, 12) (g2, n2) (11, 323)
(p3, q3, r 3) (31, 37, 3) (g3, n3) (13, 1147)
(p4, q4, r 4) (37, 41, 17) (g4, n4) (17,1517)
(p5, q5, r 5) (57, 23, 27) (g5, n5) (19, 1311)
Sharing algorithm s0 7
r 0 3
w1 12
w2 33
w3 17
w4 3
w5 13
A 47
Fig. 2 (a) shared image in Fig. 1(b); (b) shared image in Fig. 1(c); (c) reconstructed image from (a) and (b) with cheated w1 ¼ 23 and w2 ¼ 33.
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hard to be found.20 Moreover, an attacker can only cheat
ri and acquire g0 and n0 over networks. He has to find pi
from ri ¼ gpi0 mod n0 and it’s also a hard work when n0 is a
very large number. Since ap 0i satisfying the equivalence veri-
fication is hard to be found, any cheated secret keywill always
be detected.
The shared image is verified by public data Tk and expo-
nent computation. For an attacker, he cannot find n in step
4.4 of the sharing algorithm. Therefore the calculated hi;j
from his cheated shared message x 0i;j and the following com-
putations, hi;j ¼ cyi;j mod n and yi;j ¼ x 0fii;j mod ni, is very
hard to be equal to the original hi;j obtaining from public
data Tk. Consequently, the shared image is hard to be
replaced by any cheated shared image.
The common modulus attack20 indicates that secret
message m can be recovered by two secret keys e1 and e2
corresponding with two shared messages m1 ¼ me1 and
m2 ¼ me2 , respectively. Since e1 and e2 are relatively
prime, there are two numbers a1, a2 such that a1e1þ
a2e2 ¼ 1. Therefore the computation is then obtained as fol-
lowing equations ðm1Þa1 ⋅ ðm2Þa2 ¼ ðme1Þa1 ⋅ ðme2Þa2 ¼
ma1e1þa2e2 ¼ m. Note that all above computations are calcu-
lated under mod N.
In the proposed scheme, the shared messages for
participants P1 and P2 are ½fkðrs01 Þg1 mod n1 and½fkðrs02 Þg2 mod n2, respectively. Since fkðrs01 Þ ≠ fkðrs02 Þ,
and n1 ≠ n2, the common modulus attack cannot be mounted
by anyone who has only two secret messages. This property
also shows that ½fkðrs01 Þa1g1 ⋅ ½fkðrs02 Þa2g2 cannot recover the
coefficients bi in fkðxÞ ¼ ðb0 þ b1xþ : : : þ bt−1xt−1Þ, even
though a1g1 þ a2g2 ¼ 1. Furthermore, since t shared mes-
sages corresponding with secret keys meets the proposed
(t, n) thresholds, so we can obtain these bi coefficients.
4 Experimental Results and Discussion
4.1 Experimental Results
This section presents the experimental results obtained from
the proposed method. The test image is LENAwith a size of
512 × 512, and the selected thresholds are (2, 5). This thresh-
old assignment shares the secret image with five participants,
and collecting any two correct participants’ secret keys with
shared images recovers the secret image. Figure 1(a) shows
the secret image LENAwith a size of 512 × 512 and Fig. 1(b)
to 1(f) shows five shared images corresponding with secret
keys, as defined in Table 1. The set thresholds of (2, 5)
acquire a shared image with size 512 × 256.
Figure 2 uses a cheated secret key w1 ¼ 23, instead of
correct w1 ¼ 12, to recover the secret image. Since the secret
key is wrong, the cheated secret key will be detected in the
proposed scheme. If we ignore the wrong detection in step 2
of recovering with verification algorithm, we acquire the
recovered secret image as shown in Fig. 2(c). Another
experiment on cheated shared image is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Figure 3(b) shows the cheated shared image, where Fig. 3(a)
and all secret keys are correct. Ignoring the cheated shared
image detection and keeping calculation acquire the recon-
structed secret image as shown in Fig. 3(c). In these two fig-
ures, we find that any cheated secret key or shared image
Fig. 3 (a) shared image in Fig. 1(b); (b) cheated shared image in Fig. 1(c); (c) reconstructed image from (a) and (b) with w1 ¼ 12 and w2 ¼ 33.
Table 2 Characteristics comparison between the proposed scheme
and important literatures.
Features
Features of schemeSchemes
Ref. 2 Multisecret images sharing
Ref. 18 Shared image verification
Ref. 3 Progressive reconstruction
Ref. 8 Visual cryptography and secret image sharing
Ref. 1 Secret image sharing
Ref. 21 Scalable shared image
Ref. 11 Shared image size constraint
Ref. 19 Secret key verification
The proposed
scheme
Secret key and shared image verification
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causes the wrong reconstructed secret image. Note that the
proposed scheme can detect any cheated secret key or shared
image efficiently. Therefore the wrong reconstructed secret
image such as Figs. 2 or 3 will not be acquired in the pro-
posed scheme.
4.2 Comparisons and Discussion
Theproposedschemeverifiesparticipants insecret imageshar-
ing problem. Two comparisons are provided in this section.
First an overall comparison between the proposed scheme
and other important works1–3,8,11,18,19,21 is listed in Table 2.
Second, a comparison of the secret image-sharing schemes
with cheater identification properties is shown in Table 3.
Table 2 shows a comparison of characteristics between
these propositions. These characteristics include sharing
multiple images,2 image verification,18 progressive,3 visual
cryptography and secret image sharing,8 perfect secret
image sharing,1 scalability,21 size constraints,11 secret key
verification,19 and secret key and shared-image verification
proposed in this paper.
Table 3 shows a comparison of the results between the
proposed scheme and other secure secret image-sharing
schemes.18,19 Four conclusions are drawn from this table.
First, the proposed scheme verifies both secret keys
and shared images, which perform better than previous
studies18,19 that verify only either the shared image or secret
key. Second, the required parameters loads, including dealer
processing and public sharing, are few more than required by
Refs. 18 and 19. Third, the extra load is cause by the free
hash function, and the extra load is limited. At last, secret
key selection is determined by participant and this process
can be done over networks. Therefore, Tables 2 and 3
show that the proposed scheme has significant property of
detecting cheaters both in secret key and shared image.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a secret image-sharing scheme with
the properties of detecting cheaters both in secret key and
shared image.Theproposedschemepresents threealgorithms:
initial, sharing, and recovering with verification. The strategy
for key validation is different from previous works. We
allow each participant to select his or her secret key, and the
dealer checks the validity of each key. Verification during
imagerecovery isalsobasedon theparticipant’s selectedsecret
key. This property of determining secret key from aparticipant
fits the network requirementwell. Security analysis and exper-
imental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme behaves
strongsecurity coverage.Futureworkwill focusoncombining
other characteristics suchasmultiple imagesharing toenhance
the benefits of the proposed scheme.
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